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Overview
Under The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(“BAPCPA”) (S. 256, Pub. L. No. 109–8, 119 Stat. 23), debtors are subjected to a test in order to
ensure their creditors are repaid as much as possible. Chapter 13 requires debtors in bankruptcy
to file a plan indicting a monthly amount they will repay to creditors over a given set of years.
The amount to be repaid is a debtor’s entire “disposable income,” which is income minus
expenses. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2007). Deductable expenses are to be calculated the same as a
chapter 7 filing. See 11 U.S.C. §§1325, 707. When subtracting expenses, Chapter 7 directs filers
to use the “applicable” standard amounts, which are averages issued by the Internal Revenue
Service. However, there is currently a split among circuits as to whether these standard averages
are intended to be used in all circumstances or as a cap when debtor’s actual expenses are above
average. As a cap, debtors who do not meet the “maximum” would use their actual amounts and
creditors would be entitled to higher repayments.
The Second Circuit recently evaluated this issue when a debtor subtracted the applicable
standard amount using the IRS’s data. A creditor wanted the court to direct the debtor to only
subtract the lower, actual expense, thereby increasing the debtor’s disposable income allowing
the creditor a larger return. At the time of that case, and still today, there is far from a clear
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majority on either side and courts continue to base their holdings on various rationale, such as
the existence of other standards, statutory construction, legislative intent and policy concerns.
BAPCPA
BAPCPA was passed in an effort to safeguard creditors from overzealous consumers. As
protection, a “best interest of creditors” test is applied to a debtor’s plan; plans not submitted in
good faith will not be confirmed. 6 Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, Collier on Bankruptcy
§ 1325 (15th ed. 2007). For example, if a debtor’s disposable income is too high, their plan will
not be confirmed and they will be required to repay their debt on their own. Additionally,
BAPCPA created a “bright line test” to ensure debtors repay creditors as much as possible.
Colliers, supra § 1325.08.
The Means Test
The bright line test created under BAPCPA, commonly called the “means test,” is applied
to chapter 13 debtors with above average incomes to ensure that a repays creditors as much as
the debtor can afford. See In re Kibbe, 361 B.R. 302, 314 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2007) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 109–31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005)). The objective means test subtracts specified expenses from
the debtor’s “current monthly income;” the difference is defined as “disposable income.” 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)–(3); 4 Hon. William L. Norton, Jr. & William L. Norton III, Norton
Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 151.20, 151.22 (3d ed. 2008). Current monthly income is
defined under the Code as the “average monthly income from all sources” to the debtor. 11
U.S.C. § 101(10A). If a debtor’s income is above the median for their state, they are entitled to
deduct expenses. See Norton, supra, § 151.22; U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, CENSUS BUREAU
MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME BY FAMILY SIZE (2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20090315
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/bci_dat a/ median_income_table.htm (providing requisite data to compare to the debtor’s
income). The expenses to be deducted are identified as the “applicable monthly expense
specified under . . . [s]tandards [issued by the Internal Revenue Service], and the debtor’s actual
monthly expenses for . . . Other Necessary Expenses [as categorized by the Internal Revenue
Service].” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The difference, the disposable income, is the amount
expected to be paid out to creditors. Norton, supra, § 151.20.
IRS Standards
The IRS, for their own department’s purposes, collects national and local figures
regarding individuals’ expenses. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, COLLECTION FINANCIAL
STANDARDS (2009), http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html. Depending on
the expense’s category, the data is either computed and averaged nationally or locally. After
BAPCPA, the IRS has created a separate set of data, which is more frequently updated, for
bankruptcy filing purposes. See U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, MEANS TESTING (2009), http://www.us
doj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/meanstesting.htm. The IRS compiles one national figure for each of the
common expenses, such as food, clothing and out-of-pocket health expenses. See U.S. TRUSTEE
PROGRAM, IRS NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALLOWABLE LIVING EXPENSES (2009),
http://www.us doj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20090315/bci_data/national_expense_standards.htm. The
IRS also compiles local data, broken down by county, for housing expenses as well as
transportation expenses based on census information. See MEANS TESTING, supra. Under
BAPCPA, the Code § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) directs filers to this information to calculate expenses.
Additionally, a debtor may deduct actual amounts for “[o]ther [n]ecessary [e]xpenses,” if
necessary, as defined by the IRS, which includes accounting and legal fees, charitable
contributions, child care, court-ordered payments, and taxes. See Norton, supra § 151.22;
Cite as: Applying the “Applicable” Standard or the Actual Amount: Monthly Rent in a Debtor’s
Chapter 13 Plan, 1 ST. JOHN’S BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. No. 5, at 3 (2009),
http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/journals/abi/sjbrl/volume/v1/ chiarenza.stj
(follow “View Full PDF”).

Chiarenza - 4

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUEL, 5.15.1 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS HANDBOOK § 5.15.1.10
(2009), http://www.irs.gov/irm/par t5/ch15s01.html#d0e214358.

Financial Analysis Handbook
Like the means test, revenue agents use the IRS Standards to negotiate tax repayment
plans. See Norton, supra § 151.22; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUEL, INTRODUCTION TO
THE IRM

§ 1.11.2.1(5) (2009), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part1/ch08s02.html. The applicability of

the IRS Standards is detailed within the Internal Revenue Service Manuel’s Financial Analysis
Handbook. See FINANCIAL ANALYSIS HANDBOOK, supra. For example, reviewing the average
income and expenses, an agent can assess whether the taxpayer is using “best efforts” to repay
all past due, unpaid taxes the IRS. See Norton, supra § 151.22.
The Issue
BAPCPA’s reference to the IRS Standards has created much confusion over when, or if
always, the standards are to apply. The overall purpose of BAPCPA was to ensure creditors are
repaid as much as possible, however, the process was meant to be more formulaic. In re Morgan,
374 B.R. 353, 362 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); In re Quigley, 391 B.R. 294, 303 (Bankr. N.D.W.
Va. 2008) (quoting In re Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167, 184 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007). The applicability
of the standards under the Code can be read either as a “fill-in,” or merely a cap when actual
expenses are above average. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A), 1325(b)(3). This issue is frequently
contended because the less a debtor deducts the higher the disposable income, which is assumed
under BAPCPA to be the amount a debtor can afford to pay to a creditor. This issue was recently
addressed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in In re Osei
where a creditor, seeking to ensure a debtor would be repaying as much as possible, questioned
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whether debtors are allowed to hide behind the IRS Standard housing expense when their actual
expenses were lower. 389 B.R. 339, 340 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).

The Facts
The debtor in Osei had an actual rent expense of $1,150 per month, yet in calculating the
disposable income, the debtor claimed $1,494, the IRS Standard for Bronx County. Osei, 389 at
341. A creditor asserted that IRS Standards used in repayment plan calculations were intended
only to be used as caps limiting the deducted expenses of debtors, as opposed to fill-ins. The
creditor urged that when a debtor’s actual expenses are lower, the actual is meant to be applied.
The creditor sought this application because the seemingly small $344 per month difference
between the standard and actual rent would amount to an additional $20,640 payout to the
creditor over the life of the plan.
While the court in Osei determined the use of the standards applied regardless of actual
amounts under plain meaning, it reviewed four other methods of analysis: IRS’s use of their
standards, interpretation of the statutory language, legislative intent, analogous transportation
cases, as well as policy concerns. In reviewing these, the court found there was “no clear
consensus” as to whether the standard or a lower actual amount applied. Id. at 344.
Is the IRS’s Use of the Standards Persuasive?
The creditor in Osei sought to establish the IRS’s use of its standards was persuasive to
the bankruptcy court’s use of the same standards. Osei, 389 at 345 (quoting Weiland v. Thomas
(In re Thomas), 382 B.R. 793, 798 (D. Kan. 2008)). For the purpose of collecting unpaid taxes,
the IRS does not use standards as fill-ins. Taxpayers will normally be allowed the local standard
or their actual expenses, which ever is less, to calculate what can affordably be repaid.
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FINANCIAL ANALYSIS HANDBOOK, supra, § 5.15.1.7. Under the premise that the reference to the
IRS Standards in the Code implicitly carries the IRS’s use of the standards, creditors claim when
debtors calculate disposable income, the standard can be used, unless actual expenses are less. Id.
The Osei court found two problems with the creditor’s IRS argument. First, the creditor
misinterprets and deceptively portrays the Handbook’s language. The IRS allows a flexible
approach and does not mandate the lower amount be used, as urged by the creditors. FINANCIAL
ANALYSIS HANDBOOK, supra, § 5.15.1.7(4)–(5). The IRS allows the national standards to be
used without questioning the actual amount of a taxpayer’s expenses. Id. at § 5.15.1.8. Second,
the Handbook’s purpose is to guide tax collection, not bankruptcy and the Handbook is never
mentioned in the Code. Osei, 389 at 345. Moreover, the IRS disclaims their standards and directs
those seeking information on bankruptcy to the U.S. Trustee website. Osei, 389 at 355.
Interpreting the Statutory Language
The court in Osei found no ambiguity in the plain meaning of sections 1325 or 707.
Osei, 389 at 346. However, courts which held debtors must apply their actual, lower expenses
have found two ambiguities in the Code’s direction to calculate disposable income. Section
1325(b)(2) states:
“[i]f the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless… (B) the
plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income… will be
applied… under the plan. . . “[D]isposable income” means current monthly
income . . . less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended[, which] shall be
determined in accordance with. . . section 707(b)(2)[(A)].” 11 U.S.C. §
1325(b)(2).
Section 707(b)(2) states: “monthly expenses shall be the debtors applicable monthly expense
specified under . . . [s]tandards [issued by the Internal Revenue Service], and the debtor’s actual
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monthly expenses for . . . Other Necessary Expenses [as categorized by the Internal Revenue
Service].” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
First, courts have found the word “applicable” in section 707 may mean ‘“as applied by’
the IRS through the [Financial Analysis] Handbook.” Osei, 389 at 346 (quoting In re Slusher,
359 B.R. 290, 307–08 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2007) (finding that if Congress intended the Standard,
regardless of the actual expense amount, the word applicable would be “superfluous”)). The
court in Osei claims courts finding ambiguity are taking an inexplicable leap, a “tortured
reading,” that would require one to look beyond plain meaning. Osei, 389 at 348–49. The word
“applicable” is used for expenses listed in the National and Local Standards contrasted to the
word “actual” used for Other Necessary Expenses. Id. See In re Fowler, 349 B.R. 414, 418
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (stating use of two different words, applicable and actual, shows a
legislative intent for different standards to apply); In re Demonica, 345 B.R. 895, 902 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2006) (stating the use of two different terms, applicable and actual, is intent of two
different calculation methods).
Second, courts have found ambiguity with the phrase “in accordance with.” For example,
in In re McGillis, the court found the phrase “in accordance with,” as opposed to more forceful
language, gave courts discretion to ensure expenses comply with the reasonableness requirement
of section 1325(b)(3)). 370 B.R. 720, 729 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007). Creditors urge that this
discretion means the standards are not fill-ins; the standards use may be reviewed by a court
regarding their applicability. The court in Osei disagrees with the idea of judicial discretion
McGillis attempts to create. Osei, 389 at 350–51. The court in Osei assumes if Congress intended
this discretion regarding the reasonableness of expenses, Congress would have used deliberate
language to convey such an intent. Id. at 351.
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Congress’ Construction of BAPCPA
House of Representative reports, like other canons of statutory construction, are places of
reference for assessing legislative intent once ambiguity is found in a statute. While the report on
BAPCPA is useless to interpret disposable income, the Osei court focused on the report’s general
statement of purpose of BAPCPA. See In re Nance, 371 B.R. 358, 365 n.7, 366 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
2007); In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005). The report states BAPCPA was
created to “ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford.” Osei, 389 at 352.
The court held the only interpretation that would further the BAPCPA objective was to use the
data in a “raw” form as a fill-in, requiring no analysis or comparison. Osei, 389 at 352 (quoting
In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1,9 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2007)). This process allows calculating expenses to
be more “formulaic” or “mechanical” as the bright-line as was intended for the means test. Osei,
389 at 352 (quoting In re Farrar-Johnson, 353 B.R. 224, 228 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006)). To
support this, the court refers to House members who opposed the BAPCPA amendments.
Opponents found the expense formula “inflexible” and “divorced from the debtor’s actual
circumstances,” so the court reasoned the majority must have intended a rigid fill-in formula.
Osei, 389 at 353 (quoting In re Grunert, 353 B.R. 591, 594 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006)).
Additionally, language removed or rejected can be interpreted as intent to mean the
legislature specifically did not want those words to be included. Osei, 389 at 353. The language
removed in this case was “as determined under”; replaced with “applicable monthly expense
amounts.” Id. (citing In re Fowler, 349 B.R. 414, 419 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)). The court held the
removal indicated “determinations” are now unnecessary; the amount is merely what is
“applicable.” Osei, 389 at 353.
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Local Transportation Expense
Due to the lack of decided cases regarding the application of standard housing costs, the
court looked to cases dealing with the other local averaged expense, transportation. See Osei,
389 at 342 n.1. Because there is a split in case law, the court looked to other circuit courts and
within the second circuit for direction as to whether the IRS Standard or a lower actual amount
should be applied. Id. at 344.
At the time Osei was decided, the only circuit decision held standard transportation costs
should apply despite actual costs being lower or non-existent. Hildebrand v. Kimbro (In re
Kimbro), 389 B.R. 518, 522–24 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 2008). Similarly, within the Second Circuit
there were three district court cases that addressed transportation costs and each held in support
of the use of the standard regardless of a debtor’s actual expenses. See In re Schneider, No. 0732487, 2008 WL 1885768, at *2–3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2008); In re Roberts, No. 07210247, 2008 WL 542503, at *1, *4 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2008); In re Austin, 372 B.R.
668, 678 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007) (holding disposable income is to be calculated based on standards
without regard to actual expenses). The court chose to keep in line with the second circuit and
the sixth circuit while acknowledging that district courts elsewhere are of the opposing view.
Policy Concerns
If the IRS Standards are not fill-ins but merely caps, one policy concern is the perverse
incentive for debtors to spend as much as they can on housing and transportation in order to
claim the maximum local standard deduction. Osei, 389 at 355. This punishes a debtor’s
frugality instead of rewarding it. Id. at 355–56. Courts that require the use of actual expenses
when below standard also recognize this unexpected result. For example, one court noted the
debtor probably moved into a significantly smaller and less expensive home as a temporary
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measure in order to pay off debt. Id. at 356 (discussing In re Rezentes, 368 B.R. 55, 62 (Bankr.
D. Haw. 2007)). However, due to the large size of the family it would be unlikely the debtor
would remain in the new residence for the entire length of the payment plan. Osei, 389 at 356.
Had the debtor remained in the prior home, the entire standard deduction would have applied. Id.
Unfortunately, the debtor, having moved to save money, was only allowed to deduct the actual
housing expense. Id. The Osei court included the facts of Rezentes to emphasize an erroneous
and unfair result.
Another policy concern is the uncertain nature of expenses. Osei, 389 at 356. For
example, rents often increase at renewal, property taxes may be increased yearly, and people
may need to move. Increases are bound to occur throughout the life of a repayment plan. Id.
Similarly, a debtor may have a below average vehicle payment because their car is old, however,
that vehicle may incur greater expenses from required repairs due to normal wear and tear. Id..
Increases in expenses lower a debtor’s expendable income and may allow or require debtors to
request changes to their plans, taking up courts’ and debtors’ time and resources. Id.
Conclusion
BAPCPA was intended to ensure debtors repay as much as possible, courts have held it
was also intended to make bankruptcy filings easier by removing judicial discretion causing
contradictory results with regard to IRS Standards. There has been a clear affirmative step to
keep the IRS Standards to apply to housing costs as applied to transportation costs. See In re
Morgan, 374 B.R. 353, 362 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007). However, there is such a clear split of
authority regarding transportation expenses that to even assess the statute solely under plain
meaning is pointless (the court in Osei found plain meaning was enough but still chose to shoot
down all the other areas on contention). In the nine months since the Osei decision was issued
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only one court has cited it, and even then it was merely listed in a long string of other cases on
the issue. In re Coffin, 396 B.R. 804,807–08 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008). The only way this issue will
be able to be resolved is through Congressional revision to the statute or a Supreme Court
decision because it does not appear a consensus will be able to be reached without instruction.
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